PART III
UNCOMPROMISING
Conservative Power Challengers
A great divide separates two opposing power challengers in the world of
Islam: (1), the progressive secular group, known as the pro-secular and
holder of the Imperial Sceptre like Turkey, the reformist, and (2), the
conservative hardliners? bearers of the Sword of Allah, like Saudi
Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan, The Sudan and Libya.
In the world of Islam, the above two opposing groups are in constant
challenge of each other. Except for Secular Turkey, most of the Islamic
states are established on this duel-type system. Such a system results
in a series of constant clashes between the two opposing groups: group
of the secular state laws and that of the sectarian religious laws.
Since Islamic countries establish their governing system on the
teachings of the Koran and the Hadeeth, the two courts become obligingly
entwined.
On occasions, they run in confluence with each other, and on others,
they clash with each other, causing suffering to the person caught up in
such judiciary decisions. The person involved becomes a victim of an
ambiguous judicial system. This might sound bizarre, but it is a fact.
This has been the case since the inception of Islam.
Muslim progressive leaders with true liberal trends in the Abode of
Peace often meet with a violent end. Conservative Power Challengers
(CPC), carrying the sword in the name of religion, cut the liberals
down, disallowing them to introduce constitutional reforms to
democratise their countries on secular lines. CPC are the ardent Muslims
and religious leaders, advocates of sectarianism. They allegedly hold
jurisdiction over the lifestyle of their subjects and their daily
activities. They are upholders and guardians of the Islamic law. They
monitor the conduct of their subjects, making sure that they do not
stray from (Al-Sirat Al-Mustaqeem) the straight path of the faith.
Activities are watched, especially in matters of religion, association
and morality. Engagement in sports, public entertainment and all forms
of athletics, is practised under the strict guidelines of the Islamic (shari’ah)
law.
Islamic Conservative Power Challengers (CPC) act as guardians on the
morality of Islam. They machinate the elimination of elements that
advocate and indulge in secular activities that disagree with the
Islamic tradition. CPC accuse Muslim liberal-minded leaders of
secularism and apostasy. They issue religious edicts (fatwa) against
them, condemning them to death. The attempt on the life of Riyadh Al-Solh,
the Prime Minister of Lebanon in the early 1950s was followed by the
assassination of King Abdullah of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in
July 1951. The current Iraqi Regime of the Ba’ath Party ambushed General
Abdul Karim Qassim in Baghdad in 1963. He was killed in cold blood. The
dethronement and fleeing of Muhammad Reza Shah from Iran in 1979 ending
his kingship, and the assassination of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt in
October 1981, by members of an Islamic Organisation named Al-Jihad, are
just a few examples of the violent methods Islamic Conservative Power
Challengers adopt in terminating liberal leaders.
CPC, hoisting the banner of Islam, resort to violence. In a show of
force, they challenge liberal leaders that have social and progressive
trends. Liberal leaders that lean towards Western culture or enhance the
Western parliamentary system are targeted for total elimination.
Muslim leaders with liberal tendencies raise doubt in the minds of
Islamic Conservative Power Challengers about their sincerity to Islamic
traditions. CPC accuse such liberal-minded leaders of secularism, of
treachery, of abandoning the Islamic values and of collusion against
Muslim states of the Abode of Peace.
CPC are a combination of self-seeking ambitious collaborators, not
necessarily clerics, comprising of ardent Muslims and religious leaders.
They form an opposing front in an attempt to eliminate secular leaders.
CPC use the teachings of the Koran and the Hadeeth (sayings and deeds of
the prophet) to justify their actions.
Liberal-minded leaders suspend secular reforms for fear of being branded
deviant and un-Islamic. The risk of being branded apostate for
introducing democratic reforms becomes real. According to the Islamic
Shari’ah Law, their elimination becomes lawful, after pronouncing a
fatwa verdict against them. (Pryce-Jones, 1989: pp 112-113, 251, 323,
358; Hiro, 1989: pp 15, 29, 80). In Surat al-Imran 3:118, the Koran
instructs Muslims not to befriend non-Muslims: “Believers, do not
make friends with any men other than your own people”.
In the eyes of Islam, Westernisation is secularisation; hence
self-indulgence. No matter how liberal, strong or despotic Muslim
secular leaders may be, they are prisoners of the CPC. With the backing
of the radical Islamic spiritual leaders, CPC factions pressure Islamic
secular leaders to revert to the rule of the Islamic shari’ah law,
according to the demands of the Koran and the Hadeeth, and the hidden
agenda of Dar Al-Silm and Dar Al-Harb. Saudi Arabia and Iran have
already taken the lead, followed by the Sudan, Libya, Algeria,
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Indonesia seems to want to follow suit.
Leaders who advocate secular ideals face growing opposition. The
religious authority, in collaboration with CPC, want the secular leaders
to project themselves as advocates of the Islamic doctrine and work
towards redemption of Islam, rather than sway towards secularism.
To be confirmed and remain in office and hold on to power, a secular
leader needs to swear allegiance to uphold the Islamic doctrine, adopt
the Islamic Shari’ah Law and reform his country in the interest of the
Abode of Peace and Islamic (umma) nation, over and above all other
secular interests. The slightest deviation from (Al-Sirat Al-Mostaqeem)
the straight path of the Islamic faith will immediately attract
Conservative Power Challengers to counter him. They lie in wait to
topple him. CPC seek the support of the religious authority to gain a
religious edict (fatwa) to justify his elimination, violently if need
be. It is an entrapment. By law, a Muslim person, whether male of
female, cannot opt out of his/her religion, how much more a Muslim
leader. By introducing secular reforms, he is allowing himself to be
branded an apostate, hence liable to elimination. According to Islamic (shari’ah)
law, a fatwa against him becomes warrantable and his elimination lawful
(halal). (Hiro, 1989: p19; Polk, 1991: p491; Aburish, 1995: p117.
Conservative Power Challengers view the secular leaders as their
opponent and deviant. In their view, reprehensible Muslims are those
that pose questions, are soft on Western ideals, befriend the natives,
express their own personal views or enhance secularisation. Regardless
of status, Muslims who break the Islamic Shari’ah Law or dare debate
religion or criticise the ruling system openly, expose themselves to
unnecessary risk. CPC accuse such persons of heterodoxy. They describe
them as disbelievers and slanderers.
Unless secular leaders repent and return to the fold of Islam and
abandon secular reforms, their elimination becomes justifiable. King
Abdullah, Abdul Nasser, Assad and Sadat - all four Arab leaders had been
accused, at one time or another, of apostasy for their rapprochement to
the West. Their attempt to introduce constitutional reforms was
described by their CPC opponents as intolerable heresy. They were issued
with discreet religious (fatwa) edict for their elimination.
King Abdullah was assassinated. Although Nasser died of a heart attack
as a result of his failure to winning the war against Israel, a fatwa
issued against him earlier was another cause that had added to his
depression and sudden death. Sadat was Kalashnikov and (Alawi) Hafidh
Al-Assad, after quelling his religious CPC Sunni opponents, returned to
the fold of Islam and followed the straight path of observing its
rituals. He put the secular reforms on hold, in the hope that they would
be implemented by his succeeding son, Bashar (Pryce-Jones; 1989: pp
251-252).
For a leader of an Islamic regime, the way to survive, is to go like
Qathafi; wrap himself in traditional attire and alternatively live the
nomadic life of an Arab Bedouin, in an oasis, in proximity to his
hometown, on the out-skirts of the desert. And praised be Allah’s name.
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